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INTRODUCTION
The Defendants claim that there are no disputed facts, but neither their Brief 
nor their statement to the trial court that they “believe” there are “disputes of 
interpretation of the facts” [JA152] support such a conclusion. Material facts are 
in dispute and even the “undisputed facts,” as Defendants claim them to be, allow a 
reasonable jury to determine that arguable probable cause to arrest Branch did not 
exist.  Therefore, the Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their 
assertion of qualified immunity, the trail court’s decision should be reversed and 
the case remanded for further proceedings.   
Defendants contend that Branch’s need to use the restroom, the time of day, 
and Branch’s re-entry into the vehicle are all somehow indicative of intoxication.  
They further contend that these specious indicia of intoxication gave them arguable 
probable cause to arrest Branch for violating the Minnesota open container law 
when they found her husband’s empty flask under the passenger seat of his care 
while she was riding with him. However, they do not confront any of Branch’s 
arguments establishing that these facts do not lead to a reasonable inference of 
intoxication or the necessary probable cause to arrest Branch.  Rather than address 
the facts and inferences in dispute, and support that analysis with sufficient case 
law, Defendants cite the same cases that were used in the trial court without 
addressing or refuting the distinctions shown in the Opening Brief. 
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By the same token, Defendants ignore the critical evidence weighing against 
any determination that a reasonable officer could believe Branch was intoxicated 
and in violation of the open container law.  In doing so, Defendants attempt to 
deviate from established law requiring that probable cause be based on all the 
evidence presented and the circumstances as a whole, not simply those facts which 
could support arrest under some other circumstance.  United States v. Capers, 685 
F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1982).  Defendants do not address any of the exculpatory 
evidence known to officers at the time of arrest, such as the empty water bottles in 
the car and the admission by Branch’s husband that the flask was his.   
The only significant undisputed fact that Defendants can rely on is Branch’s 
general proximity to the flask as a passenger in the flask owner’s vehicle.
However, Defendants have not cited a single case finding constructive possession 
based on the mere proximity to an object or any other case with sufficiently 
analogous circumstances finding constructive possession.  Simply put, the 
Defendants have failed to present, and Branch could not find, any case where 
summary judgment was granted based on such a weak set of facts, many of which 
Defendants admit are open to differing inferences as to whether reasonable officers 
would have sufficient probable cause to arrest Branch.  Summary judgment was 
thus inappropriate, and the case should be reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings.
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHEN THERE ARE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACTS AND 
INFERENCES OVER WHETHER THERE WAS ARGUABLE 
CAUSE TO ARREST BRANCH 
Whether arguable probable cause existed at the time of arrest is a question 
that must be left for the jury when, as here, there is a clear dispute of material fact 
concerning whether the facts and circumstances support such probable cause. See
Livers v. Schenk, 700 F.3d 340, 352, 358-62 (2012) (finding that summary 
judgment was properly denied because there were questions of fact for the jury to 
determine).  Before the trial court, Defendants freely admitted that they “believe” 
there are “disputes of interpretation of the facts,” [JA152] and, as the Opening 
Brief demonstrates, there are also material disputes of the facts themselves.   
Defendants mischaracterize Branch’s arguments as requiring an elevated 
standard, but Branch readily agrees with Defendants that Defendants must prove 
the existence of arguable probable cause to prevail at the summary judgment stage.
See Defendant’s Br. 11.  When determining if there is a material issue of fact on 
the potential that arguable probable cause exists, a court must engage in an analysis 
of “[t]he cumulative effect of all the facts and circumstances at the time of arrest,” 
not simply the factors that might support Defendants’ decision to arrest Branch.  
United States v. Capers, 685 F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1982).  As Defendants 
correctly state, a “court may not allow a case to go forward to trial on the mere 
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chance that a jury will disregard all evidence and accept the unsupported 
speculation of a party.” Defendants’ Br. 19, citing Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 
F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992).  But when, as here, there are material issues of 
fact and when further conflicting inferences can be drawn from these facts, 
summary judgment must be denied, because “the evidence is such that a reasonable 
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Snyder v. U.S., 717 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th 
Cir. 1983). 
II. THERE ARE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACTS AND 
INFERENCES REGARDING WHETHER A REASONABLE POLICE 
OFFICER WOULD BELIEVE BRANCH WAS IN CONSTRUCTIVE 
POSSESSION OF THE FLASK 
There is no dispute regarding the underlying legal standards.  For qualified 
immunity to apply, the Defendants must have possessed arguable probable cause 
which was based on all the evidence presented and not simply those facts that 
might support arrest. Capers, 685 F.2d at 251.  Arguable probable cause here 
depends on whether a reasonable officer would have believed Branch was in 
constructive possession of the flask.  Opening Br. 11-12; Defendants’ Br. 6-7.  The 
parties further agree that constructive possession requires proof that either the item 
was under the exclusive control of the individual, or the individual was 
demonstrating conscious dominion and control over the item.  Minnesota v. 
Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975); Minnesota v. Porter, 674 N.W.2d 
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424, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).  Defendants did not meet their burden to show 
there was arguable probable cause, based on all the evidence available to them at 
the time of arrest, to believe that either Branch possessed exclusive control of the 
flask or that Branch was demonstrating conscious dominion and control over flask. 
A. A Reasonable Juror Could Find That No Reasonable Police 
Officer Would Believe Branch Exercised Exclusive Control Over 
the Flask 
While having exclusive control of an item can equate to constructive 
possession, Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611, the circumstances of Branch’s arrest 
clearly do not fulfill the definition of exclusive control.  As Florine states, 
exclusive control is when an item is found in an area “to which other people did 
not normally have access.” Id.  This is a high burden, as exclusive control is 
generally understood to be difficult to meet, and, in most cases, the court simply 
assumes that it does not apply. See e.g. Minnesota v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239 
(Minn. 2007); Minnesota v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 2004); Minnesota v. 
Robinson, 517 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 1994); Minnesota v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212 
(Minn. 1992). 
In Minnesota v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn. 1985), the Minnesota 
Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant had constructive possession of 
marijuana found in his bedroom in a shared house.  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
dismissed the exclusive control argument with a single sentence: “[t]he evidence 
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shows that other persons had access to the house, and in fact lived there, and that 
bedroom ‘2’ was not under appellant’s exclusive control.”  Id. at 270.  Similarly, in 
Minnesota v. Johnson, No. A11–2256, 2012 WL 4476527 at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 1, 2012), the court considered constructive possession of a weapon in an 
automobile.  There the court determined that Johnson had exclusive control when 
he was discovered to be the operator and sole occupant of a vehicle, after leading 
police on a chase which ended at his home and after he had sole possession and 
control of the vehicle prior to fleeing police.  Id. Based on these facts, the court 
found exclusive control over the vehicle, and thus exclusive control over the 
weapon inside. Id.
Thus, to obtain summary judgment based on exclusive control, the 
Defendants must show that it is not possible for a reasonable jury to find that 
Defendants acted unreasonably in determining that the space beneath the passenger 
seat was a place over which no one, apart from Branch, normally had access.  
However, it is clear that a jury could find that Defendants were unreasonable if 
they believed that Branch had exclusive control of the space underneath the 
passenger seat.  It was not her car, she was not the driver, she was not the car’s 
only occupant at the time the car was pulled over, and the flask was found in a 
location where it is reasonable to believe that she did not even know it was there 
(most passengers do not check under the seat when entering a car or riding with 
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someone else).  Much like the shared house in Wiley, there were other regular 
occupants, and here, there was even another occupant at the time of the arrest. 
Defendants suggest that after Branch’s husband was removed from the 
vehicle and arrested, “the area under her seat was within her exclusive control.”
Defendants’ Br. 14.  However, Defendants plainly cannot remove the driver of the 
vehicle, arrest him and then immediately turn around and assert that now Branch 
has exclusive control.  Indeed, at the time Defendants arrested the driver they also 
had control over Branch and presumably would have seen if Branch had done 
anything furtive under the seat.  The car was the possession of Branch’s husband 
and he clearly had access to the vehicle including the space under the passenger 
seat.  Branch, at the time of the arrest, neither had exclusive control of the vehicle 
as a whole or the flask located underneath a seat accessible to anyone on the 
vehicle and it would be unreasonable for the Defendants to believe otherwise. 
B. A Reasonable Juror Could Find That No Reasonable Police 
Officer Would Believe That Branch Had Conscious Control of the 
Flask  
The Defendants’ Brief does not address Branch’s arguments concerning her 
lack of conscious control over the flask.  Instead, Defendants appear to simply rely 
on Branch’s proximity to her husband’s flask and spend a substantial amount of 
time refuting minor issues about the contents and specific location of the flask.  
Defendants’ Br. 17.  However, conscious dominion and control requires much 
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more than mere proximity; it requires knowledge of the illegal substance, ability to 
control it, and intent to do so. United States v. Serrano-Lopez, 366 F.3d 628 (8th 
Cir. 2004).  The standard requires a strong inference that an individual at one time 
physically possessed the substance and did not abandon that possessory interest in 
the substance but rather continued to exercise dominion and control over it up to 
the time of the arrest.   Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 610-11.  Conscious dominion and 
control can be demonstrated in three ways:  furtive movements, ability to identify 
the illegal object or substance, and when the individual is the sole occupant of the 
vehicle. Minnesota v. Munoz, 385 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).  None 
of these factors are present in this case in this case. 
First, Defendants do not claim they observed Branch making any suggestive 
or secretive movements in an attempt to conceal the flask.  Second, according to 
Branch, she was unaware that the flask was in the vehicle.  JA135.  Since 
Defendants claim that the location of the flask is immaterial, and concede that it 
was found in the passenger compartment, for the purposes of argument, Branch 
will assume the flask was completely under the passenger’s seat out of view.  
Defendants’ Br. 4, 11.  With the flask located completely under the seat and out of 
Branch’s view, Branch disavowing any knowledge that the flask had been there, 
and Branch’s husband stating that the flask was his own, [JA135], a reasonable 
jury could determine that it was unreasonable for Defendants to believe that 
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Branch had constructive possession of the flask.  Given these very limited facts, 
Defendants could have engaged in more investigation.  If they had, they may have 
learned that, among other things, Branch had not seen the flask for an entire year 
because it came with a gift set her husband received for his birthday. Id.  A 
reasonable jury could find that, based on the totality of these circumstances, 
Defendants did not possess arguable probable cause and are not entitled to 
qualified immunity.
Defendants make the attenuated argument that Branch showed sufficient 
indicia of intoxication for them to have probable cause to believe that she had 
consumed alcohol which in turn gave them probable cause to believe that the 
alcohol came from her husband’s flask found in the vehicle which in turn gave 
them arguable probable cause to believe she was in violation of the Minnesota 
open container law.  Defendants have not provided a single case establishing that 
an indicia of intoxication provides the probable cause necessary to arrest a 
passenger under the open container law.  That is not surprising given the fact that, 
in cases like this, even if there were indicia of intoxication, it would no more 
suggest that the passenger was drinking in the car than it suggests that the 
passenger was drinking at the prior location before entering the car. 
Moreover, the facts Defendants use to support their theory do not establish, 
as a matter of law, that it was reasonable to believe she was intoxicated.  Common 
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indicia of intoxication include slurred speech, swaying movements, bloodshot 
eyes, and an individual who smells strongly of alcohol. See e.g. Musgjerd v. 
Commissioner of Public Safety, 384 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Minn. App. 1986); Thomas 
v. Drover’s Inn Associates, CIV.02-1682(DWF/SRN), 2003 WL 22738538, at *5 
(D. Minn. Nov. 13, 2003).  Prior to her arrest, Branch did not exhibit any of these 
characteristics which might give rise to arguable probable cause.  Instead of 
pointing to any of these common factors, Defendants articulate four factors that 
allegedly indicate Branch was consuming alcohol:  (1) the urgent need to use a 
restroom; (2) time of day; (3) her re-entry of the vehicle on the driver’s side; and 
(4) some purported argumentative nature.  Defendants’ Br. 15.  Based on the 
evidence taken in the light most favorable to Branch, a jury could find that none of 
these factors are sufficient, taken individually or together, to lead a reasonable 
officer to believe that Branch was intoxicated.
While an urgent need to urinate is indicative of the consumption of liquids, it 
is not suggestive of the consumption of alcohol over any other liquid.  Opening Br. 
19.  There were multiple water bottles in the vehicle and Branch was drinking 
water as they drove the vehicle home.  JA 131-32.  Defendants make no effort to 
explain how these facts, known to Defendants at the time of arrest, would not lead 
a jury to find that Branch’s need to urinate was not an indication of intoxication.  
Moreover, Branch’s multiple requests to urinate, whether twice or twenty times, 
- 11 - 
are of no consequence whatsoever because she was never allowed to relieve herself 
and the urge, therefore, would not subside.  Opening Br. 19.  The urge to urinate 
does not simply go away like a headache.  Defendants do not address any of this in 
their brief, but it could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the urge to urinate 
was not a reasonable indication of intoxication.
Likewise, the time of day is not indicative of alcohol consumption or 
intoxication.  Defendants argue that nighttime is a more likely time for an 
individual to consume alcohol, but they do not provide any support for this 
conclusion.  Nor do they account for the contrasting fact that it was a Sunday night, 
which is a night on which most people are less likely to drink alcohol than other 
nights of the week.  Some courts have found that time of day may be a relevant 
consideration to conduct further investigation, but only when the time of day is 
specifically connected with other, more suggestive factors.  See e.g. Minnesota v. 
Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn. 1988) (stating that there was an “objective 
basis for believing that it was necessary to scientifically ascertain defendant’s 
blood alcohol level” after the driver fled the scene of an accident, because, among 
half a dozen other factors, “it was the time of day that, when an accident such as 
this occurs, drinking is often found to be involved”); Columbus v. Anderson, 74 
Ohio App. 3d 768, 770 (1991) (stating that an officer had a reasonable suspicion 
sufficient to conduct a field sobriety test due to “the moderate odor of alcoholic 
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beverage, and the time of day”).  The trial court used time of day to justify an 
arrest, rather than to justify a field sobriety test.  A reasonable jury could resolve 
that the failure to undertake a field sobriety test indicates that these weak indicia of 
intoxication are more post hoc rationalization than a true basis for Branch’s arrest. 
Moreover, the time of day, without significant connection to other activity, 
is not sufficient to support an inference of drinking or intoxication.  For example, 
in United States v. Nicholas, the court found time of day unpersuasive.  104 F.3d 
368 (table), 1996 WL 731605 at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1996) (unpublished 
opinion).  The Tenth Circuit stated that “the connection between the early hour and 
the likelihood of Mr. Nicholas’s intoxication is counter-intuitive.”  Id.   The court 
reasoned that time of day would be important if the defendant was falling asleep at 
the wheel or engaging in general malfeasance, but early morning hour did not 
make drinking a logical step.  Id.; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979) 
(concluding that nighttime activity per se is not sufficient to create reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity). 
Here, Branch was an unassuming passenger, not engaging in any criminal or 
otherwise inappropriate activity.  While she was traveling in a vehicle with her 
husband at night, Branch provided a very reasonable explanation for the time of 
day completely unrelated to any indicia of intoxication.  Shortly after midnight, she 
was returning home from a church event she attended with her husband that 
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evening.  JA132.  There is simply nothing related to the time of day to increase the 
likelihood that Branch was intoxicated and certainly the time of day could not give 
Defendants arguable probable cause to arrest Branch for a violation of the open 
container law based on some assumption that she had been drinking alcohol out of 
her husband’s flask. 
Branch’s reentry of the vehicle on the driver’s side and purported belligerent 
behavior also are no indication of intoxication when viewed in the light most 
favorable to Branch.  As Branch noted in the Opening Brief [at 20], and 
Defendants fail to even address, Officer Garbisch himself testified that Branch’s 
purported belligerence was typical of an average person in a police situation.  JA 
91-92.  Officer Garbisch testified that Branch’s uncooperativeness constituted 
“questioning what I was doing, if I knew what I was doing, why I was doing it, that 
sort of thing,” and said that such questions were very typical of people who were 
being detained by the police, because they are generally not happy to be there.  JA 
90-91.  As with the other purported factors indicating intoxication allegedly 
sufficient to give rise to arguable probable cause, Branch’s actions indicate nothing 
more than any typical person detained by the police.  Given that Branch’s reaction 
was the typical reaction of someone who is being held by the police, a jury could 
find it unreasonable for those same officers to conclude that Branch’s behavior was 
indicative of intoxication.
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None of the purported indicia of intoxication that Defendants have rehashed 
in their brief indicate Branch was intoxicated at the time of the arrest and they 
certainly do not demonstrate arguable probable cause that Branch had constructive 
possession of the flask.  Simply repeating the trial court’s erroneous recitation is 
not enough.  Defendants should have addressed the reasoning establishing that 
these facts are not indicia of intoxication when taken in the light most favorable to 
Branch.  But they apparently have no response.  That is unsurprising because there 
is no response—a reasonable jury could find the officers’ purported belief that 
Branch was intoxicated to be unreasonable under the circumstances. 
Given the disputes of material facts on Defendants’ only purported 
justification for arresting Branch and the disputed inferences drawn from those 
facts, summary judgment in Defendants’ favor was improper.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the grant of summary judgment to the 
Defendants-Appellees in this case should be reversed and the case should be 
remanded for further proceedings.
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